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FINDING A NEW HOME FOR THE ABORTION RIGHT
UNDER THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
Allison N. Kruschke* 
ABSTRACT 
This essay advocates locating the foundation of the constitutional 
right to an abortion in the Ninth Amendment. Using the Ninth Amendment 
to recognize the right to an abortion, this article argues, is a better path 
than using the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes the determination 
of whether an abortion is a protected right outside the moral realm. The 
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment of whether a right is “deeply 
rooted in the tradition” of the United States inevitably stirs a debate about 
whether the public considers abortion morally acceptable. In recognizing 
the right to an abortion under the Ninth Amendment, no such analysis is 
necessary. The text of the Ninth Amendment allows the U.S. Supreme 
Court to recognize this protected right without an inquiry into historical 
tradition. Instead, the Court can use natural law principles, as 
contemplated by the Founders, to recognize that private conduct is worthy 
of constitutional protection and acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment 
affords these rights to the people. 
The Ninth Amendment states that “the enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”1 This provision of the Constitution 
recognizes that citizens of the United States have rights that are not 
expressly contemplated in the text of the Constitution.2 The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged this concept throughout its history, most notably 
in its recognition of a right to privacy that encompasses fundamental and 
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
2. Id. 
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other protected rights such as childrearing, procreation, contraception, and 
abortion.3 In doing so, however, the Court has usually found that these 
unenumerated rights are protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not “retained by the people” under the Ninth 
Amendment.4 
Despite the fact that the Ninth Amendment gives courts the authority 
to recognize unenumerated fundamental rights, the Court has been 
reluctant to use, analyze, or even acknowledge the Ninth Amendment and 
its implications.5 The landmark case discussing the Ninth Amendment is 
Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice Arthur Goldberg argued in his 
concurring opinion that the Ninth Amendment housed a free-standing 
right of privacy encompassing the right of married couples to use 
contraception.6 Since Griswold, the Court has mentioned the Ninth 
Amendment on approximately twenty occasions, but has not addressed 
the amendment in depth nor decided any case exclusively on Ninth 
Amendment grounds.7 
Eight years after Griswold, the Court established the right to choose 
an abortion, perhaps the most controversial protected right, in Roe v. 
Wade.8 In Roe, and nineteen years later in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held that the right to an 
abortion was protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.9 In these foundational cases, and in other abortion-related 
cases since Casey, the Court has consistently held that the right to privacy, 
and therefore the right to an abortion, is housed within the Fourteenth 
Amendment.10 Despite the Ninth Amendment’s express guarantee that 
there are unenumerated fundamental and other protected rights “retained 
by the people,” the Court has chosen to engage in the cumbersome 
3. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Name of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
4. See, e.g., cases cited in note 3. 
5. See Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. 
L.J. 759, 764-69 (1994). Sanders discusses how the Court spent little time discussing the Ninth 
Amendment before Griswold and says that “[t]he judiciary’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment 
divides neatly into two eras:” before and after the Griswold decision. 
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). 
7. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769–70. 
8. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9. Id. at 166; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–
47 (1992). 
10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47. 
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analysis required to recognize fundamental and other protected rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment time and time again.11 The Court has 
used this Fourteenth Amendment analysis to recognize not only the 
abortion right, but all rights related to private conduct found worthy of 
heightened constitutional protection.12 
While the analysis the Court uses to determine whether a right should 
be considered a protected right under the Due Process Clause is not 
without merit, housing the abortion right within the Fourteenth 
Amendment unnecessarily complicates abortion jurisprudence. Indeed, 
the Court already has the express authority to recognize unenumerated 
rights under the Ninth Amendment, including abortion.13 The recognition 
of the right to an abortion is consistent with other unenumerated rights the 
Court has recognized, from the use of contraception to the right to 
procreation.14 
Using the Ninth Amendment to recognize the right to an abortion is 
a better path than using the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes the 
determination of whether an abortion is a protected right outside the moral 
realm.15 The analysis of whether a right is “deeply rooted in the tradition” 
of the United States inevitably stirs a debate about whether the public 
considers abortion morally acceptable.16 In recognizing the right to an 
11. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Name of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
12. See, e.g., cases cited in note 11. 
13. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–69. 
14. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). While the right to an abortion 
has generally been considered the most important of a wide array of rights related to sex and 
protection, some argue that abortion is sui generis in that it takes the life of another and therefore 
involves another set of rights outside those of the mother. The argument generally is that because 
abortion “involves the purposeful termination of a potential life,” the abortion decision “must 
therefore be recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the others that the Court has protected 
under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.” See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
325 (1980); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 792 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). For these reasons, those opposing abortion argue that while 
either the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendments may allow for the recognition of unenumerated 
fundamental rights, abortion should not be one of those rights because it deals with the taking of life. 
15. See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 189–90 
(2003) (“The substantive due process doctrine’s lack of textual constitutional support persuades 
judges to limit the scope of rights granted under it. Conservative jurists ascribed to this ironic rights-
limiting view of the rights-expanding substantive due process doctrine as a mechanism for identifying 
and protecting only those rights or liberties that have a firm foundation in the murky legal, historical, 
moral or ethical tradition of Britain or the United States.”). 
16. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that the Due Process
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abortion under the Ninth Amendment, no such analysis is necessary.17 
The text of the Ninth Amendment allows the Court to recognize this 
protected right without an inquiry into whether it is “deeply rooted in 
historical tradition.”18 Instead, the Court can use natural law principles, as 
contemplated by the Founders, to recognize that private conduct is worthy 
of constitutional protection and acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment 
affords these rights to the people.19 
Part I of this Essay discusses the ratification of the Ninth Amendment 
and its subsequent jurisprudential history, as well as different interpretive 
theories scholars use to dissect the Ninth Amendment.20 Part II of this 
Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence under the 
Substantive Due Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment.21 Part III of 
this Essay analyzes the Court’s decision to house the abortion right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Ninth Amendment and argues 
that this decision was an erroneous overcomplication of abortion 
jurisprudence.22 The Essay concludes by affirming the Court’s need to re-
evaluate its abortion and privacy jurisprudence using the Ninth 
Amendment. 
I. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND ITS JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 
When the Founders drafted the Ninth Amendment, it was considered 
an important compromise that allowed for the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights.23 Since then, however, courts have afforded the Ninth 
Amendment little attention.24 Until the Supreme Court decided Griswold 
v. Connecticut in 1965, it only mentioned the Ninth Amendment on rare
occasions.25 Since Griswold, the Court has given the Ninth Amendment 
Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental.”). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (stating that the Court’s 
jurisprudence reflects “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society”). 
17. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 170. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–65. 
24. See id. at 769. 
25. See id. 
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only slightly more attention.26 Legal scholars, on the other hand, are 
starting to explore how best to interpret the Ninth Amendment.27 
A. The Ratification of the Ninth Amendment 
The text of the Ninth Amendment reads: “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”28 This amendment and the rest of the Bill 
of Rights were the result of vigorous debate among the Constitutional 
Founders about whether enumerating certain rights within the 
Constitution was necessary to protect citizens’ “unalienable” rights.29 The 
Founders, many of whom were disciples of John Locke, believed that men 
were born into a “perfect state of freedom” but divested themselves of 
certain rights by forming government and entering into the “social 
compact” for the greater good of humanity.30 In forming this social 
compact, the Founders believed that men only forfeited those rights 
necessary for effective government.31 
The debate over whether to include a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment, occurred against this 
backdrop.32 While proponents of the Bill of Rights argued that omitting 
an enumerated Bill of Rights would fail to protect people’s freedoms from 
the newly formed federal government, Federalists responded with two 
points.33 First, Federalists argued that Article I limited the federal 
government’s powers to those enumerated in the Constitution.34 Based on 
26. See id. 
27. See, e.g., id. 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
29. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–65. 
30. See id. at 765; see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (1764) (C.B.
Macpherson ed., rev. ed. 1980). Locke theorized that all people were equal in the sense that they were 
born with certain “unalienable” rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and property. Accordingly, 
Locke said that citizens created governments to better enforce the natural rights that “no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” See id. The protection of these rights required 
men to voluntarily enter into a “social compact” to give up certain natural rights in order to protect 
others. Id.  For those reasons, some scholars theorize that the Founders felt that the “natural rights” 
as discussed by Locke were the ones that were most deserving of Ninth Amendment protection. See 
id. Indeed, “Alexander Hamilton indicated similar beliefs: ‘The sacred rights of mankind are not to 
be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in 
the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never be erased or 
obscured by mortal power.’” See Sanders, supra note 5, at 802. 
31. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–65. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
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Article I, Congress could only take action that the Constitution expressly 
authorized, which did not include interfering with man’s natural rights.35  
Second, Federalists argued that a Bill of Rights, which would inevitably 
be imperfect, would forfeit those rights not enumerated within it.36 For 
this reason, some felt that the enumeration of rights would be dangerous.37 
The Ninth Amendment was the product of this debate.38 Two years 
after the ratification of the original Constitution, the states ratified a Bill 
of Rights that included the Ninth Amendment, which expressly stated that 
citizens had other rights not enumerated in the Constitution.39 This 
language was the compromise that satisfied both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists and allowed for the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.40 
B. The Court’s Interpretation of the Ninth Amendment 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Ninth Amendment can be 
divided into two distinct eras: the time period before Griswold v. 
Connecticut and the time period after Griswold.41 Up until 1965, the Court 
discussed the Ninth Amendment in fewer than ten cases.42 After Justice 
Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold, the Ninth Amendment got 
more attention than it ever had before.43 However, the Court still appears 
to be reluctant to interpret the Ninth Amendment.44 
35. See id. at 765. Alexander Hamilton expressed this view when he asked, “[W]hy declare 
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that 
the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be 
imposed?” THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513–14. 
36. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 765. Famed Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry, in arguing that a
Bill of Rights was essential to ordered liberty, said: “[Y]ou have a bill of rights to defend you against 
the state government, which is bereaved of all power, and yet you have none against Congress, though 
in full and exclusive possession of all power.” Id. Conversely, Federalists argued that an enumeration 
of “exceptions to powers which [were] not granted . . . would afford a colorable pretext to claim more 
than were granted.” Id. 
37. See id. 
38. See id.at 769. 
39. See id. at 768–69. 
40. See id. at 769. 
41. See id. (“Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in the famous Griswold v. Connecticut 
decision of 1965 marks the turning point from what may be called the B.C. era to, correspondingly, 
the A.D. era. In the B.C. (Before the Concurrence) era, the Ninth Amendment hid like a neglected 
child among its more popular sibling amendments in the Bill of Rights.”). 
42. See id. 
43. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769. 
44. See id. at 770. 
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1. Before Griswold v. Connecticut
Prior to Griswold, the Court spent almost no time examining the 
Ninth Amendment.45 The Court made only a handful of references to the 
amendment, and those references were all brief and relatively 
superficial.46 The only instance where the Court dedicated considerable 
space to discussion of the Ninth Amendment prior to Griswold was in 
United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, where the Court discussed 
the breadth of the Ninth Amendment as it related to political speech 
afforded to federal government employees.47 
In Mitchell, the United Public Workers challenged certain provisions 
of the Hatch Act, which made it unlawful for federal employees to engage 
in certain political activities.48 The workers claimed the Act violated their 
Ninth Amendment rights because it interfered with their rights to act as a 
leader or member of a political party in furtherance of their own respective 
political views.49  In rejecting the United Public Worker’s constitutional 
challenge, the Court said: 
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government 
are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and 
the people. Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a 
federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power 
under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is found, 
necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments, must fail.50 
Despite these explicit mentions of the Ninth Amendment, the Court 
declined to discuss how these rights fit within the Ninth Amendment or 
what an intrusion upon Ninth Amendment rights may look like.51 Instead, 
the Court essentially equated the protections afforded by the Ninth 
Amendment with those afforded by the Tenth and did not inquire into the 
scope of its constitutional protection or other rights it may have 
encompassed.52  After Mitchell, the Court was essentially silent about the 
45. See id. at 769. Before Griswold, the Court briefly mentioned the Ninth Amendment in
fewer than ten cases. Id. 
46. See id. 
47. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
48. Id. at 75–76. 
49. Id. at 94 (“The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a
party official or worker to further his own political views.”). 
50. Id. at 95–96. 
51. See id. 
52. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 770 (“Justice Reed obviously considered the Ninth
2020] FINDING A NEW HOME 135 
Ninth Amendment until 1965, when it handed down its opinion in 
Griswold.53 
2. Justice Goldberg’s Concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court was faced with determining 
the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that prohibited citizens from 
using contraceptives.54 The Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional based on a “right of privacy” that was found not 
explicitly within the Bill of Rights, but within its “penumbras.”55 The 
Court said that these penumbras created certain “zones of privacy” the 
government could not enter.56 Accordingly, it held that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it intruded on citizens’ right of privacy.57 The 
Court went on to discuss how it had previously recognized other 
unenumerated rights, such as childrearing and educating children that had 
undertones of rights enumerated in the Constitution.58 It felt that the right 
to privacy was no different than these other rights.59 
Justice Goldberg concurred in the judgment but declined to find that 
the right to use contraception was protected on Fourteenth Amendment or 
Amendment to be no more than an echo of the Tenth. The Ninth Amendment’s guarantee, whatever 
it was, was not offended if Congress had acted pursuant to a delegated power. Thus, the Court’s first 
reading of the Ninth Amendment not only failed to undertake, but largely precluded, an inquiry into 
its central mysteries—the nature of, and the extent of constitutional protection for, the other rights 
‘retained by the people.’”). 
53. See id. 
54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (noting that the state statutes
provided that: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of 
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days 
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned,” and that “[a]ny person who assists, abets, 
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished 
as if he were the principal offender.’”). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance. . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”). 
57. See id. (“The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in 
any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The 
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force 
him to surrender to his detriment.”). 
58. See id. at 481–82. 
59. See id. 
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Bill of Rights penumbral grounds.60 Instead, he held that the right to 
privacy, and therefore the right to use contraception free from government 
interference, was found in the Ninth Amendment.61 Like the majority, 
Justice Goldberg felt that the concept of liberty included more than what 
was enumerated within the Constitution.62 Goldberg, however, felt that 
the Ninth Amendment was the appropriate home for the right of privacy 
because it expressly acknowledged that citizens have rights not 
contemplated by the Constitution.63 In acknowledging that the right to 
privacy within the marital relationship was fundamental, Goldberg stated 
that while privacy was not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, 
denying these types of relationships constitutional protection would 
produce an absurd result.64 In Goldberg’s view, this right was one of those 
rights “retained by the people” under the Ninth Amendment.65 
While Goldberg believed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
protected rights not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, he felt that 
the language and history of the Ninth Amendment lent strong support to 
the idea that citizens had fundamental rights other than those listed in the 
first eight amendments.66 In arguing so, he said: 
While the Ninth Amendment—and indeed, the entire Bill of Rights—
originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, the subsequently 
enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as well from 
abridging fundamental personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment, 
in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the 
first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of 
60. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. Goldberg concluded that “the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the 
view that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the 
Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight 
amendments.” Id. 
64. See id. at 495–96. 
65. See id. (“The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State 
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family—a relation as old and as fundamental as our 
entire civilization—surely does not show that the Government was meant to have the power to do so. 
Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as 
this one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned 
in the Constitution.”). 
66. See id. at 493 (“The Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view that the
‘liberty’ protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the federal 
government or the states is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight 
amendments.”). 
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other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as 
federal, infringement.67 
From Goldberg’s perspective, the Founders intended for the Ninth 
Amendment to protect citizens from government overreach and to ensure 
that they retained other “natural rights” not enumerated in the 
Constitution.68 
Some have criticized the Griswold Court for employing tenuous 
reasoning to find privacy as a right protected by the penumbras of the Bill 
of Rights.69 According to one scholar, the Court’s majority opinion in 
Griswold was “an indefensible leap in reasoning” that “pushed the Court 
to make a methodical change in textual interpretation.”70 Furthermore, 
others have suggested that Justice Goldberg was unable to secure a 
majority using this reasoning because he used an interpretation of the 
Constitution that harkened back to the Founders’ original intent in drafting 
the Ninth Amendment.71 In avoiding applying Goldberg’s “original 
intent” reasoning, some argue that the Court fell back on amorphous 
language that allowed it to use its own judgment to pinpoint what rights 
were worthy of constitutional protection.72 
Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold was the first time a Justice used 
the Ninth Amendment to recognize a fundamental or otherwise-protected 
right not enumerated in the Constitution, and the first opinion that 
discussed the Ninth Amendment in detail.73 Since then, the Court has 
mentioned the Ninth Amendment approximately twenty times, but its 
references continue to be trivial, and the Court has not decided any 
decisions solely on Ninth Amendment grounds.74 Overall, the Court still 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. See Derek Alexander Pope, A Constitutional Window to Interpretive Reason: Or, in Other 
Words . . . the Ninth Amendment, 37 HOW. L.J. 441, 443 (1994) (“Justice Douglas then discussed an 
array of cases that protected rights not mentioned in the Constitution. He later noted that ‘[w]ithout 
those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.’ Then, in an indefensible leap in 
reasoning, Douglas framed the infamous basis of contention.”). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See Pope, supra note 69, at 446–47 (“In this century, numerous cases have spoken in such 
amorphous terms when attempting to pinpoint exactly those rights endemic to human existence. The 
Court’s attempt to clarify the inarticulable has saddled it with incomplete expressions such as, 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ ‘fundamental,’ and ‘immutable principles of justice’ as 
conceived by a civilized society.’”). 
73. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769–70. 
74. See id. at 772. (“The Amendment, moreover, has appeared in some of the Court’s most
famous A.D.- [after Griswold] era cases, including Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, Buckley v. 
Valeo, and Bowers v. Hardwick.”). 
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appears to be uninterested in how and when to interpret the Ninth 
Amendment.75 
C. Interpretive Theories of the Ninth Amendment 
There are many theories of constitutional interpretation that scholars, 
judges, and legal professionals use to decipher the Ninth Amendment. 
These approaches include: original intent theory; the textualist approach; 
and theories describing the Constitution as a “living document.”76 The 
theories discussed in this Section offer some insight into how the Court 
has thought about the Ninth Amendment, or how it may think about it in 
the future. 
1. Original Intent
Some scholars argue that the Ninth Amendment shows the Founders’ 
intent to recognize that other rights may exist that were not enumerated in 
the Constitution.77 According to Professor Randy Barnett, “[t]he Founders 
very firmly intended that the Ninth Amendment would include 
fundamental, morally based rights from their generation that should 
continue to be followed by succeeding generations. In short, they 
contemplated that their original intent regarding rights would be adhered 
to by succeeding generations.”78 This approach points to an interpretation 
of the Ninth Amendment that emphasizes the Founders’ adherence to 
natural rights and desire for those rights to be constitutionally protected, 
even if unenumerated in the Constitution.79 
75. See id. 
76. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 782–83. 
77. See Duane L. Ostler, Rights Under the Ninth Amendment: Not Hard to Identify After All, 7 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 35, 46–47 (2013) (“Jefferson favored the idea that the unchangeable laws of 
nature—such as those embodied in the Ninth Amendment—controlled each generation, even if the 
constitution each generation formed had expired.”). See also Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth 
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TX. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (arguing that “the way a member of 
the public would today read the Ninth Amendment—before being exposed to a more ‘sophisticated’ 
interpretation—was also its original public meaning at the time of its enactment.”). 
78. See Barnett, supra note 77, at 50. 
79. See id. at 50–51 (“The Ninth Amendment is steeped in natural rights and social compact
theory. Interestingly, most scholars who discuss the Ninth Amendment agree that it was meant to 
secure natural rights as understood by the founding generation . . . [but] these are points that are not 
very popular today. It is more fashionable to try and change the Ninth Amendment to fit with the 
times, turning the Founders’ clear meaning into something more socially acceptable in a world where 
moral values have become secondary.”). 
2020] FINDING A NEW HOME 139 
2. The Textualist Approach
Strict textualists take the Ninth Amendment’s language at face value 
and find that the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights from 
government intrusion.80 Some textualist scholars invoke the 
Constitution’s structure, historical context, and jurisprudential trends in 
attempting to find meaning in the Ninth Amendment, but contend that 
these sources should only be applied when the text of the Constitution 
causes an ambiguity.81 Critics of these scholars argue that there is no 
ambiguity in the Ninth Amendment—the document itself states that there 
are unenumerated rights retained by the people.82 As one scholar noted: 
The Ninth Amendment’s meaning cannot be compromised by peripheral 
legal arguments. While a strong smoke screen can be established 
through these positions, one need look no further than the text of the 
amendment to dissipate the cloud of smoke. A brief reading of the 
amendment leads to a simple and obvious conclusion—individuals 
retain unenumerated rights outside the enumerated rights in the 
Constitution. Unless the Ninth Amendment is repealed or altered 
through a constitutional amendment, courts have a duty to give full 
effect to its term.83 
For textualists, there is no need to determine what the Ninth 
Amendment actually means—that meaning is clear.84 The only question 
that remains is how to determine what rights are protected by the Ninth 
Amendment.85 
3. The Constitution as a Living Document
Proponents of the theory that the Constitution is a living document 
see the Ninth Amendment as an open-ended clause that requires judicial 
interpretation in order to discern how it applies to modern constitutional 
issues.86 To this end, the Ninth Amendment allows for the constitutional 
protection of individual rights that may develop over time—i.e., rights 
80. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 191–92. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill 
of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. LAW REV. 1143, 1143 (“Is it even possible to deduce the spirit of a law 
without looking at its letter?”). 
81. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 192–93. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 194 (“The Ninth Amendment acknowledges these restrictive problems and
suggests that the Constitution is capable of adapting to societal change.”). 
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that an evolving society will recognize as fundamental that the Founders 
may not have contemplated.87 Scholars who view the Constitution as a 
living document ask whether asking what the Founders intended from the 
Constitution makes sense in a modern context.88 
In sum, the Ninth Amendment was largely ignored in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence prior to Griswold.89 Even after Griswold, the Court’s 
references to the Ninth Amendment have been minimal.90 Legal scholars, 
however, have given the amendment more attention. In doing so, scholars 
have discussed various theories of interpretation to examine the Ninth 
Amendment.91 Whether the Court will follow legal scholars’ lead in 
interpreting the Ninth Amendment as it relates to certain fundamental and 
otherwise-protected rights such as abortion remains to be seen. 
II. ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE UNDER SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT 
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence can be boiled down to 
two seminal cases: Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided in 1992.92 In 
each of these cases, the Court found that the right to an abortion was 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Neither case discussed the implications of the Ninth Amendment on the 
discussion of whether the right to an abortion was protected by the 
Constitution. 
A. An Overview of the Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Under 
Substantive Due Process 
The Court decided both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey under the Substantive Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 The Casey Court affirmed the 
central holding of Roe that the abortion right was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.94 The Ninth Amendment was only briefly cited 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). 
90. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769–70. 
91. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 15, at 192–93. 
92. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
93. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
94. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
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in Casey, when the majority opinion used it to support the assertion that 
the Fourteenth Amendment should protect rights both enumerated and 
unenumerated within the Constitution.95 
1. Roe v. Wade
The Court first recognized the right to obtain an abortion free from 
government interference in Roe v. Wade.96 In Roe, the Court held that a 
woman’s right to an abortion was rooted in the right to privacy, which 
protected the most sacred decisions regarding marriage, childrearing, and 
sexual activity.97 In holding that the right to privacy, and therefore the 
right to an abortion, was protected by the Constitution, the Court 
acknowledged that the document did not explicitly recognize a right to 
privacy.98 Instead, the Court held that the right to privacy was housed 
within the Substantive Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.99 
The Roe Court refined the rule regarding personal privacy that it set 
forth in Griswold, where it recognized the right to marital privacy under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and certain 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights.100 Within the Fourteenth Amendment 
context, the Court said that women had a right to obtain an abortion and 
that the abortion right fell within the right of privacy.101 The Court noted, 
however, that the right was not absolute and was subject to some degree 
of state regulation.102 The Court in Roe did not address the Ninth 
95. See id. at 847 (“It is . . . tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only 
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference 
by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”). 
96. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
97. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court 
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the 
State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.”). 
98. See id. at 152 (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy.”).
99. See id. 
100.  See id. (“In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. 
v. Botsford . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or 
individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment . . .  in 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights [in] Griswold v. 
Connecticut . . . in the Ninth Amendment [in Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold]; or in the concept 
of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
101.  See id. 
102.  See id. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the 
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Amendment as a possible vehicle for the right of privacy or the right to an 
abortion; in fact, it outright dismissed the lower court’s assertion that the 
right to privacy was housed in the Ninth Amendment.103 
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Casey, the Court upheld the central holding in Roe but adopted the 
“undue burden” standard instead of the strict scrutiny applied in Roe.104 
The Court also discarded the trimester framework set forth in Roe. This 
new rule set forth in Casey said that states may regulate abortion so long 
as those regulations do not place an undue burden on women seeking 
abortions prior to viability.105 A regulation may place an undue burden on 
women seeking abortions when it creates a substantial obstacle to 
obtaining an abortion prior to viability.106 The Court created this test in 
order to avoid the pseudo-legislative aspect of the trimester framework set 
forth in Roe.107 
The Casey Court affirmed that the right to privacy, and therefore the 
right to abortion, was housed within the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.108 In placing the right to privacy and the abortion 
right squarely within the Due Process Clause, the Court noted that, while 
the Due Process Clause applies first and foremost to rights enumerated 
within the Bill of Rights, it applies to unenumerated rights as well.109 The 
Court spent an extensive amount of time in Casey discussing the use of 
the Due Process Clause to protect unenumerated rights.110 In doing so, the 
Court noted that the Due Process Clause had never been read to protect 
only those rights enumerated in the Constitution.111 Further, the Court 
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state 
interests in regulation.”). 
103.  See id. at 153. 
 104.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-467 
(1992) (“After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of 
institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding 
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”). 
105.  See id. at 874. 
106.  See id. at 877. 
107.  See id. 
108.  See id. at 846 (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no 
State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ The 
controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”). 
109.  See id. at 847–48. 
110.  See id. 
111.  See id. 
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noted that the Constitution did not limit unenumerated rights to those that 
would have been contemplated by the Founders when the Constitution 
was drafted.112 
Interestingly, in its discussion of why it felt that the right to privacy 
and, therefore, the abortion right, were housed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court actually cited the Ninth Amendment.113 The 
majority opinion in Casey noted that “[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the 
specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty 
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects,” and then cited the Ninth 
Amendment as support.114 The Casey Court appears to cite the Ninth 
Amendment not to say that the right to privacy or the right to abortion 
could be protected by the Ninth Amendment, but to acknowledge that 
there are, in fact, unenumerated rights that are protected by the 
Constitution.115 In Casey, the Court cited the Ninth Amendment not as a 
protector of rights in and of itself, but as an express authority for the Court 
to recognize unenumerated rights as being protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.116 
Furthermore, the Court noted in Casey that an analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires the Court to exercise its subjective 
judgement against the “deeply rooted” standard.117 In doing so, the Court 
noted that: 
[T]he inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process 
claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to 
exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have 
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of 
expression as a simple rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate 
state policy choices with which we disagree; yet neither does it permit 
us to shrink from the duties of our office.118 
 112.  See id. at 847 (“It is . . . tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only 
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference 
by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”). 
113.  See id. at 848. 
114.  See id. 
115.  See id. 
116.  See id. 
117.  See id. at 849. 
118.  See id.; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (“[T]he full scope of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the 
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated 
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the 
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Overall, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment housed the 
rights to privacy and to abortion.119 Since Casey, states have used the 
undue burden standard to determine if abortion regulations violate 
people’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
B. The Lower Court’s Examinations of Abortion as a Ninth 
Amendment Right: The Northern District of Texas’s Opinion in 
Roe v. Wade 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, lower courts 
examined several constitutional challenges to abortion regulations.120 
Interestingly, the lower court’s ruling in Roe relied heavily on the Ninth 
Amendment in determining that the abortion regulation in question was 
unconstitutional.121 The Supreme Court later rejected this ruling when it 
decided the case.122 
The Northern District of Texas relied on the Ninth Amendment to 
find the Texas abortion laws at issue unconstitutional.123 In doing so, the 
court used Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold as the 
starting point for determining whether a right was encompassed within the 
Ninth Amendment.124 The court acknowledged that the summation of 
jurisprudence surrounding abortion and other rights related to 
childbearing and rearing showed that there was an area of personal privacy 
into which the government could not intrude.125 The court felt that this 
jurisprudence supported the assertion that the right to engage in private 
conduct, such as choosing whether to have children, and therefore the 
right to an abortion, was protected by the Ninth Amendment.126 
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a 
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive 
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted 
to justify their abridgment.”). 
 119.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915, Stevens, J. concurring (“The woman’s constitutional liberty 
interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal 
nature.”). 
120.  See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
121.  See id. 
122.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
123.  See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1221 (“On the merits, plaintiffs argue as their principal contention 
that the Texas Abortion Laws must be declared unconstitutional because they deprive single women 
and married couples of their right, secured by the Ninth Amendment, to choose whether to have 
children. We agree.”). 
124.  See id. at 1221–22. 
125.  See id. at 1222. 
126.  See id. 
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Unlike in later opinions, the Northern District of Texas saw the Ninth 
Amendment as a better home for unenumerated rights than the Fourteenth 
Amendment.127 While the court acknowledged the importance of 
protecting rights that “bear in a fundamental manner on the privacy of 
individuals,” the court did not seem to hold that the abortion right was 
fundamental only because it constituted private conduct.128 Instead, the 
court seemed to acknowledge the abortion right as a freestanding right 
under the Ninth Amendment.129 After the Supreme Court rejected this 
characterization of the abortion right when it decided the case in 1973, 
courts have not attempted to place the abortion right under the Ninth 
Amendment, and no one has challenged an abortion regulation under 
Ninth Amendment grounds.130 
In sum, the Court’s landmark abortion cases, Roe and Casey, 
establish a right to privacy— and therefore, a right to an abortion—within 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 This finding in 
Roe was a departure from the Northern District of Texas’s opinion in the 
same case, which found that the right to an abortion was secured by the 
Ninth Amendment.132 Since Casey, the Court has consistently recognized 
the right of privacy and abortion to be found within Substantive Due 
Process.133 
 127.  See id. See also Tom C. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional 
Appraisal, 2 LOY. L.A.  L. REV. 1, 8 (1969) (“The result of these decisions is the evolution of the 
concept that there is a certain zone of individual privacy which is protected by the Constitution. Unless 
the State has a compelling subordinating interest that outweighs the individual rights of human beings, 
it may not interfere with a person’s marriage, home, children and day-to-day living habits. This is one 
of the most fundamental concepts that the Founding Fathers had in mind when they drafted the 
Constitution.”). 
128.  See Roe, 314 F. Supp at 1221. 
 129.  See id. at 1219. The court describes the abortion right as the right of women, “secured by 
the Ninth Amendment, to choose whether to have children.” Id. While the court discusses the “zone 
of individual privacy” from Griswold, the court does not acknowledge “privacy” as a freestanding 
right, but as a characteristic of the conduct courts have found worthy of constitutional protection. Id. 
130.  See id. 
131.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
132.  See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1221. 
133.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60–61 
(acknowledging the Court’s opinion in Roe that the abortion right was housed within the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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III. RELOCATING THE ABORTION RIGHT TO THE
NINTH AMENDMENT 
The Court has relied on the Fourteenth Amendment in its abortion 
jurisprudence.134 However, the Fourteenth Amendment may not be the 
ideal home for this right. The Court should use the Ninth Amendment to 
recognize fundamental and other protected rights, including abortion.135 
Using the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the abortion right 
unnecessarily complicates abortion jurisprudence.136 For that reason, the 
Ninth Amendment is the most appropriate home for the abortion right.137 
A. The Ninth Amendment is Severely Underutilized in Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court essentially ignored the Ninth Amendment until 
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold.138 Since Griswold, the 
Court’s references to the Ninth Amendment have been sparse.139 Many 
commentators have suggested that the Court has avoided use of the Ninth 
Amendment because it does not know how to effectively interpret it.140 
134.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. 
135.  See Sanders, supra note 5, at 838. . 
136.  See id. See also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70 (“In contemporary constitutional 
discussions, the analytical process generally requires sifting through a tremendous amount of material 
to reach a result. The Ninth Amendment is almost the direct opposite.”). 
137.  See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70. 
138.  See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769. 
139.  See id. at 772. 
140.  See id. at 771 (stating that, while the Court has mentioned the Ninth Amendment in at least 
twenty cases since Griswold, “the Court has never figured out exactly what to do with the curious 
treasure it discovered in Griswold”). For example, Professor Kurt Lash has argued that the natural 
rights theory of the Ninth Amendment is a misreading of the history of the amendment. See Kurt 
Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.R. 331, 401 (2004). According 
to Lash, the key to determining how to interpret the Ninth Amendment rests not on whether the 
unenumerated rights “afforded to the people” are “natural rights,” but on the idea that the Ninth 
Amendment affords states the right to enact certain legislation that may not be contemplated within 
the Constitution itself. See id. Accordingly, Lash argues that: 
Contemporary assumptions about rights and powers, however, appear to have 
played an even greater role in masking the historical roots of the Ninth 
Amendment. If one assumes that the Ninth Amendment is about individual 
rights, while the Tenth is about government power, the state convention 
precursors to the Ninth Amendment disappear from view: None of the 
proposed drafts of the Ninth Amendment from the state conventions used the 
language of rights. Instead, the state conventions proposed a rule of 
construction limiting the interpretation of federal power. A historian who 
assumes that the Ninth Amendment was about unenumerated individual rights 
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Indeed, there are numerous constitutional theories to use in interpreting 
the Ninth Amendment, and each can proffer a different, and often 
competing, result.141 However, criticisms that the Ninth Amendment is 
difficult to interpret, and therefore an ineffective medium for recognizing 
fundamental and other protected rights, are misguided.142 
There are strong arguments, textually, historically, and otherwise, 
that demonstrate how to correctly use the Ninth Amendment as a tool to 
protect these rights.143 Textually, as noted by Professor Randy Barnett, 
the Ninth Amendment “means what it says.”144 The amendment clearly 
expresses that there are other rights reserved to the people that are not 
enumerated in the Constitution.145 Historically, there is a great deal of 
evidence that the Founders intended the Ninth Amendment to ensure that 
all fundamental rights would be recognized by the courts, not just those 
that were enumerated in the Bill of Rights.146 If a reader is willing to 
consider the original intent of the Founders in interpreting the Ninth 
and not government power would overlook these provisions and either 
erroneously focus attention on proposed amendments dealing with individual 
rights or assume that there were no state precursors to the Ninth Amendment 
at all. 
Id. at 423. To this end, Lash’s argument rests on the idea that interpretations focusing on the natural 
rights theory are an error both courts and legal scholars are guilty of making. Id. 
 141.  See supra Part I (describing competing theories of interpretation used to interpret the Ninth 
Amendment). 
142.  See Sanders, supra note 5, at 789. 
 143.  See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 
60 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 237 (1975) (“It seems clear from the language of the [N]inth [A]mendment 
that certain rights exist even though they are not enumerated in the Constitution, that these rights are 
retained by the people, and that by express command these unenumerated rights are not to be denied 
or disparaged by any governmental body.”). 
144.  See Barnett, supra note 77, at 5 (arguing that “the way a member of the public would today 
read the Ninth Amendment—before being exposed to a more ‘sophisticated’ interpretation—was also 
its original public meaning at the time of its enactment.”). 
 145.  See id.; see also Pope, supra note 69, at 448 (“On one level, the Ninth Amendment is one 
of the few examples the Constitution offers indicating how the document is to be read. The command 
of the amendment tells us exactly how the Constitution ‘shall not be construed.’ In fact, both the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments are ‘guides to a structural understanding of the Constitution’s enumeration 
of governmental powers and personal rights, [and] guides to the actual construction of a document 
which itself was plainly intended to enjoy the status of positive law.’  In addition to being a mandate 
of interpretation, the Ninth Amendment seems to incorporate individual rights as well.”). But see 
Lash, supra note 140, at n.14 (“In his most recent book, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Ninth 
Amendment scholar Randy Barnett points out the importance of considering amendments proposed 
by the states in determining the original meaning of the Constitution [citation omitted]. Barnett does 
not, however, discuss any version of the Ninth Amendment proposed by the states.”). 
146.  See Sanders, supra note 5, at 788–89. 
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Amendment, the historical context of the amendment’s passage appears 
to give courts broad discretion in construing it.147 
Additionally, the Court has consistently recognized rights that are 
not enumerated in the Constitution, which is essentially what the Ninth 
Amendment mandates.148 The Court is already recognizing that there are 
unenumerated fundamental and other protected rights, it is just using the 
more unwieldly Substantive Due Process analysis to do so.149 The Court 
should not shy away from using the Ninth Amendment because it serves 
as a clear-cut way to recognize these rights. In fact, the Ninth Amendment 
may be a better home for certain rights, such as the right to an abortion, 
that the Court has previously housed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. Housing Abortion Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Unnecessarily Complicates Abortion Jurisprudence 
While the analysis the Court uses to determine whether a right should 
be considered fundamental or otherwise protected under the Due Process 
Clause is not without merit, the Court already has the express authority to 
recognize unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment.150 
Furthermore, not only does the Ninth Amendment give the Court the 
authority to exercise its judgment as to what constitutes a protected right, 
it also serves as in independent source of rights.151 As one scholar noted, 
“[t]he Ninth Amendment is an authoritative source guaranteeing the zone 
of privacy, not a persuasive source supporting the constitutional 
recognition of a zone of privacy through a provision of another 
amendment” as the Court did in Roe.152 Indeed: 
147.  See id. 
 148.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–
47 (1992). 
149.  See id.; see also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70. 
150.  See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 170 (“The plain meaning of the amendment sanctions its 
authority to adjudicate whether an unenumerated right exists warranting constitutional recognition. 
This contradicts current jurisprudence adopting a substantive due process component in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
151.  See id. at 179. 
152.  See id. at 177. For example, in Griswold: 
The Court does not explain or state anything else in reference to the Ninth 
Amendment. Its text is left dangling before the curious reader’s eyes as though 
awaiting some explanation. The reason no explanation exists is because the 
Court cannot give one. It cannot explain how the Ninth Amendment can 
support recognizing a zone of privacy under the liberty component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the text and meaning of the Ninth Amendment 
precludes that conclusion. The specific guarantee under the Ninth Amendment 
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A Ninth Amendment-only jurisprudence to determine whether an 
unenumerated right exists follows the Constitution’s text . . . .This 
entirely text-based apparatus streamlines the jurisprudence through a 
credible constitutional foundation that eliminates the ability of judges to 
inaccurately alter the issue before them to reach a legal result that does 
not conform to constitutional language.153 
Using the Ninth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to house certain rights related to privacy provides a 
streamlined approach to determining which rights are constitutionally 
protected.154 A more streamlined approach to determining what 
constitutes a fundamental or other protected right is necessary in order to 
ensure that those rights extended protection are those that ensure the 
greatest protection of private rights to the people, and not simply those 
that are politicized for being “moral” or “immoral.” This method would 
remove certain rights, such as the right to an abortion, outside the realm 
of complicated Substantive Due Process jurisprudence. 
C. The Ninth Amendment is the Best Place Within the Constitution to 
House the Abortion Right 
The Ninth Amendment expressly acknowledges the Court’s 
authority to recognize unenumerated fundamental and otherwise-
protected rights, and the right to abortion is one of those rights.155 The 
recognition of a woman’s right to an abortion is consistent with other 
unenumerated rights the Court has recognized, from the use of 
contraception to the right to procreation.156 There is no need to go through 
a complicated Substantive Due Process analysis to recognize the abortion 
right.157 The Ninth Amendment already allows for the recognition of 
is that the people retain unenumerated rights. Therefore, the Ninth Amendment 
recognizes the zone of privacy that encompasses a marital couple’s choice to 
use contraceptive devices. 
Id. at 175. 
153.  See id. at 178–79. 
154.  See id. 
155.  See Sanders, supra note 5, at 788–89. 
156.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). 
157.  See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 185 (“The topsy-turvy nature of recent substantive due 
process methodology seems to conform to the result needed, depending upon which ideological block 
forms a majority. It has become based on more tradition and history, thereby, limiting the recognition 
of rights, while still expanding to contain more flexible and evolving principles when recognizing the 
existence of a fundamental right. These inconsistent analytical means undoubtedly promote the 
possibility of judicial legislation due to substantive due process’s lack of a textual origin.”) 
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unenumerated, fundamental or otherwise-protected, rights that are 
“retained by the people.”158 
Using the Ninth Amendment to recognize the right to an abortion is 
a better path than using the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes the 
determination of whether an abortion is a protected right outside the moral 
realm.159 The analysis of whether a right is “deeply rooted in the tradition” 
of the United States inevitably stirs a debate about whether the public 
considers abortion morally acceptable.160 In recognizing the right to an 
abortion under the Ninth Amendment, no such analysis is necessary.161 
The text of the Ninth Amendment allows the Court to recognize this 
protected right without an inquiry into whether it is deeply rooted in 
historical tradition.162 Instead, the Court can simply recognize that the 
right involves private conduct, which it has consistently recognized is 
worthy of constitutional protection, and acknowledge that the Ninth 
Amendment affords this right to the people.163 This technique would 
ensure that a controversial and politicized right such as abortion would 
not be exempted from constitutional protections just because reasonable 
minds could differ as to whether an act is deeply rooted enough in our 
collective consciousness. 
From this perspective, the Court does not necessarily need to 
recognize a stand-alone right to privacy in order to recognize the right to 
an abortion.164 Under the Ninth Amendment, the abortion right can be 
recognized as fundamental or otherwise protected in and of itself.165 
Instead of recognizing a protected right to privacy that encompasses the 
right to an abortion, the Court could choose to affirmatively recognize the 
right to an abortion that is protected because it involves objectively private 
158.  See id. 
159.  See id. at 189–90. 
160.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that the Due Process 
Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental.”). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (stating that the Court’s 
jurisprudence reflects “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”). 
 161.  See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 232 (“An objective reading of the Ninth Amendment should 
lead to an almost universal conclusion - unenumerated rights exist outside those enumerated in the 
Constitution. But it is amazing how the legal community creates complex issues. Instead of following 
the Ninth Amendment’s text, the United States Supreme Court created the substantive due process 
tall-tale, and it continues to this day.”). 
162.  See id. 
163.  See id. at 175. 
164.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
165.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221-22 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
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conduct.166 To this end, the Northern District of Texas was correct in 
holding that the abortion right was housed under the Ninth Amendment.167 
The court correctly acknowledged that abortion can be a stand-alone right 
under the Ninth Amendment.168  Furthermore, the court acknowledged 
that the summation of jurisprudence surrounding abortion and other rights 
related to childbearing showed that there was a zone of privacy into which 
the government could not intrude.169 Unlike in other later opinions, the 
Northern District of Texas saw these rights as being protected under the 
Ninth Amendment.170 The Supreme Court’s departure from this reasoning 
in its decision in Roe was an error. 
As a practical matter, it may be less cumbersome for the Court to 
continue to recognize a right of privacy encompassed by the Ninth 
Amendment and acknowledge that, as objectively private conduct, 
abortion should be considered a right protected by the Ninth 
Amendment.171 For that reason, the standard the court should use to 
determine if certain conduct is worthy of constitutional protection should 
be whether the conduct falls within the realm of natural rights.172 Natural 
rights theory is based on the principle that neither individuals nor 
government can take action that would cause harm to another citizen’s 
life, property, health, liberty, or possessions.173 In turn, citizens must 
voluntarily engage in a social compact to give up certain rights in order to 
ensure that the state can protect other rights and run efficiently.174 Under 
this understanding of natural rights theory, the right to an abortion is 
clearly a right that should be afforded constitutional protection. The 
decision of whether to have an abortion implicates the personal liberty of 
pregnant people. It can also implicate health and life in cases where 
carrying the pregnancy to term may threaten it. Allowing the government 
to regulate private conduct affecting health, life and liberty would run 
afoul of natural rights theory. Indeed, all of these values are those 
contemplated by natural rights theory, and are therefore appropriate to 
afford constitutional protection. 
166.  See id. 
167.  See id. 
168.  See id. 
169.  See id. at 1222. 
170.  See id.; see also Clark, supra note 127, at 8. 
171.  See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1222. 
172.  See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 207. 
173.  See LOCKE, supra note 30, at 8. 
174.  See id. 
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Furthermore, an interpretation of the Ninth Amendment that allows 
for the constitutional protection of rights within the natural rights umbrella 
is consistent with several competing theories of interpretation of the Ninth 
Amendment.175 Using natural rights theory as the measuring stick for 
what constitutes an unenumerated right is consistent with a historical 
understanding of the Ninth Amendment, which was steeped in natural 
rights theory.176 However, it also allows for the flexibility to protect 
natural rights that may not have been contemplated by the Founders but 
are still important to the ethical and efficient functioning of modern 
society.177 While it is unlikely that the Founders thought about the right 
to an abortion when enacting the Ninth Amendment—or any other issue 
related women’s sexuality or autonomy, for that matter—the overall 
concept of natural Rights allows for the Court to protect those rights that 
fall under this relatively broad umbrella. To this end, the Court can 
determine whether the conduct is within the same or similar character of 
other natural rights—rights that involve personal liberty, autonomy, 
privacy, life or health—and extend constitutional protection accordingly. 
Opponents of abortion criticize the idea that abortion could be 
protected by the Ninth Amendment or considered a natural right.178 As 
one scholar argues, under both natural rights theory and other 
philosophical mechanisms such as the harm principle, abortion is contrary 
to the law of nature because it involves the taking of life.179 Accordingly, 
he argues that: 
[F]or the Founders if there was a conflict between a man-made law and 
the laws of nature, the latter should prevail. Simply put, whatever the 
common law had to say about abortion is significantly subordinate to 
natural law. To say that the common law should prevail in respect to 
abortion is to elevate the trivial over the essential.180 
 175.  See Barnett, supra note 77, at 2 (“The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that 
all individual natural rights had the same stature and force after some of them were enumerated as 
they had before; and its existence argued against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers.”). 
176.  See id. 
177.  See id. 
178.  See Ostler, supra note 77, at 75. 
179.  See id. (“Hence, natural law writers Burlamaqui, Grotius, and Pufendorf—who were 
heavily relied on by the Founders—were in agreement that abortion at any stage of pregnancy was 
contrary to the law of nature, and that the unborn should be protected from the moment of 
conception.”). 
180.  See id. at 77. 
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This argument is similar to other anti-abortion arguments that 
abortion is sui generis and different from other rights that implicate 
privacy because it involves the taking of life.181 
This argument does not hold up to careful scrutiny, however, because 
the very essence of natural rights theory actually allows for the protection 
of abortion, despite the fact that it acts upon a fetus.182 Imposing state 
control on the decision whether to have an abortion would amount to an 
infringement upon the liberty of the pregnant person, which would 
arguably be contrary to natural law. Furthermore, the prohibition of 
abortion would, in many circumstances, directly affect the health or life 
of pregnant women, which would also go against natural law principles.183 
Natural law principles do not have to stand for the proposition that unborn 
life must be preserved in spite of the liberty of pregnant women, whose 
autonomy was likely not contemplated by the Founders or philosophers 
the Founders admired.184 An interpretation of natural law theory that takes 
into account its historical importance but also recognizes its place in a 
modern context can serve as a mechanism to protect the abortion right 
under the Ninth Amendment. 
In sum, the Court should use the Ninth Amendment to recognize 
fundamental and other-protected rights, including that of abortion.185 
Using the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the abortion right 
unnecessarily complicates abortion jurisprudence, and rights that fall 
under the natural rights umbrella can be effectively protected by the Ninth 
Amendment.186 The Ninth Amendment is the most appropriate home for 
the abortion right.187 
 181.  See id.; see also Mattei Ion Radu, Incompatible Theories: Natural Law and Substantive 
Due Process, 54 VIL. L. REV. 247, 276 (“Consequently, abortion is never morally acceptable if the 
being destroyed by the act is in fact an innocent human person. It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to answer fully that extremely important moral question. It is enough to point out that an 
overwhelming majority of current natural law thinkers agree that abortion is the killing of an innocent 
human person and is therefore illicit.”). 
 182.  See The Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt Oral Argument: A Roundtable Discussion 
with Members of NYU Law Students for Reproductive Justice, 41 HARBINGER 155, 163 (2016). 
183.  See id. at 157. 
184.  See Sanders, supra note 5, at 788–89. 
185. See id. 
186.  See id.; see also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70. 
187.  See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 105. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Amendment expressly grants the Supreme Court authority 
to recognize fundamental and other-protected rights that, while not found 
within the text of the constitution, are “retained by the people.”188  Despite 
this grant of authority, the Court has been reluctant to use or interpret the 
Ninth Amendment. Instead, the Court has relied on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to house protected rights related to 
privacy, as well as a free-standing right to privacy itself. The analysis of 
whether a right should be afforded constitutional protection under the 
Substantive Due Process Clause requires the Court to engage in a 
cumbersome analysis of whether a right is deeply rooted in our nation’s 
tradition. This analysis inevitably requires the Court to wade into the 
murky waters of whether a right is considered moral by the American 
public. 
To this end, the Court’s findings in Roe and Casey that the right to 
an abortion is encompassed by a right of privacy that is housed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment are erroneous. The Ninth Amendment is the more 
appropriate home for the abortion right. Under the Ninth Amendment, the 
abortion right can be recognized as a protected right in and of itself. 
Indeed, the Court can use natural law principles, as contemplated by the 
Founders, to recognize that private conduct is worthy of constitutional 
protection and acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment affords these 
rights to the people. Using this analysis would ensure that the most 
important of our natural rights, including the right to an abortion, are 
afforded constitutional protection. 
188.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
